In terms of cost, health insurance is the most important voluntary nonwage employee benefit, representing 8.4 percent of total compensation and 26.5 percent of the cost per hour worked for nonwage benefits at the end of 2014. 5 Several largely descriptive studies using different data sources indicate that, in the early 2000s, premiums were similar between sectors, but that since then, premiums for plans offered to public employees have grown faster than those offered to private employees. Using data from the 2004 Kaiser/HRET Employer Health Benefits Annual Survey to compare private and public sector managed-care offerings, Christopher
Reddick found that premiums were slightly higher in the public sector. 6 More recent Kaiser/HRET survey estimates indicate that, by 2014, the average single coverage premium for nonfederal public enrollees had reached $6,727, compared with $5,646 for private sector enrollees in firms with a for-profit ownership structure. 7 Private sector enrollees at not-for-profit organizations had premiums ($6,587) much closer to those for public sector enrollees. Using data from the 2014 MEPS-IC, Karen Davis found that public sector premiums for single coverage were higher than private sector premiums in all census divisions except West South Central. 8 Previous studies provided limited information on why plans offered to public employees had higher premiums.
Reddick found that, in 2004, private sector employers were more likely than public sector employers to offer alternative health plan options such as high-deductible health plans and health savings accounts. 9 In addition, a few studies using semistructured interview data from the Community Tracking Survey examined how employers responded to rising health benefit costs in the early 2000s. 10 Survey responses suggested that public employers were more reluctant than private firms to reduce the generosity of health benefits. For example, public employers were less likely to increase copayments for prescription drugs or to introduce tiered formularies that required enrollees to pay more for certain branded drugs. 11 Greater unionization in the public sector also served as an important constraint on the ability of state and local governments to cut benefits in response to rising healthcare costs.
In this article, we extend the comparative literature on public and private health insurance premiums. We explicitly consider the extent to which differences in mean premiums for plans covering public and private sector enrollees can be explained by differences in benefit generosity as opposed to differences in workforce and employer characteristics. In other words, do public sector enrollees receive more generous health benefits than their private sector counterparts, or are they just more expensive to insure?
Data
The MEPS-IC is a nationally representative survey of establishments fielded annually by the U.S. Census Bureau under sponsorship by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. Despite its name, this component of the MEPS is not a panel but a repeated cross-section of establishments. The MEPS-IC collects data from employers in the private and public sectors, but public sector information is gathered only from state and local governments, not the federal government. 12 In 2014, state and local governments employed 5.3 million and 13.9 million workers, respectively, compared with over 121 million employees in the private sector. 13 The MEPS-IC sample of private sector establishmentsa sample containing between 30,000 and 35,000 observations in most years-is drawn annually from the most recently updated version of the Business Register, which is maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau. The unit of observation is the establishment, rather than the firm, and it is possible for multiple establishments from a single 4 firm to appear in the sample as separate observations. Roughly two-thirds of the observations are single-unit establishments (for which there is no distinction between the establishment and the firm).
The state and local government sample for the MEPS-IC is much smaller-roughly 3,000 observations per year -but is nationally representative of nonfederal public employees. The public sector data include all state government units and local government units with at least 5,000 employees. These units represent a census and therefore lack a sampling error. The data also include smaller local governments that are sampled from the Census of Governments, with stratification by census division. This sampling is performed at the governmentunit level, which is defined as all sites under a single controlling government entity. 14 Local governments include counties, municipalities, townships, special districts, and school districts, and most of their employment is in elementary and secondary education. While the activities of state governments span different industries, they are concentrated in higher education, corrections, and hospitals.
The MEPS-IC asks private and public sector employers whether they offer health insurance to their active workers. For those offering insurance, the survey instrument includes detailed plan-level questions for up to four health plans for private sector establishments and all health plans for state and local governments. These questions ask about premiums, plan type, employee premium contributions, coverage of certain benefits (e.g., prescription-drug and dental coverage), whether the plan was self-insured, deductibles, copayment amounts, coinsurance rates, and limits on out-of-pocket spending. The MEPS-IC also collects information on establishment and workforce characteristics, such as the size of the firm or government unit, the percentage of the workforce that is unionized, and whether the employer provides health insurance to retirees.
Methods
To examine differences between public and private premiums, we use 2000 and 2014 MEPS-IC data and Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition methods. Because the employer sizes for private sector and local government establishments both range from small (fewer than 10 employees) to large (1,000 or more employees), our localprivate comparisons compare premiums for all enrollees in local governments with premiums for all enrollees in the private sector. 15 Since all state government employers have at least 1,000 employees-and size is an important predictor of whether an employer offers health insurance and the comprehensiveness of benefits-our comparisons of state government and private sector premiums restrict the sample of private establishments to those in firms with 1,000 or more employees.
We analyze differences in mean public and private sector premiums, as shown in equation (1). We perform these analyses separately with data for 2000 and 2014. In the equation, the subscript represents each of the 2 years examined, and the subscripts public and private refer to the specific public and private sector establishment types included in each comparison.
We estimate equation (2) as a pooled regression of premiums for public and private sector enrollees for each comparison set:
where represents the vector of slope and intercept parameters from the pooled regressions within each year for each comparison set, and represents the vector of predictors and a constant.
Using equation (2) to calculate the mean difference in premiums in equation (1), we can rearrange the regression coefficients and expected values of our independent variables so that they can be used in an
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. The decomposition is shown in equation (3), where represents coefficients from the pooled regressions within each year and each comparison set, and and represent coefficients from models run separately for the samples of public and private enrollees in each comparison set.
The expected values of the independent variables are estimated with the use of the means of the variables in our samples.
where the explained component and the unexplained component .
Note that the interpretation of our results depends on how we interpret the coefficients. If the coefficients reflect a degree of correlation with unobserved variables, we may be attributing differences to a predictor even though the true difference may be due to an unobserved variable. Because this issue is problematic in interpreting our measure of unionization (described below), we perform a number of sensitivity tests to evaluate our results with respect to this measure.
For each year, we show the dollar amount of the premium differences that are due to differences in the characteristics of public and private sector enrollees (i.e., the explained component). The amount for the unexplained component can be calculated as the total mean difference in premiums minus the amount for the explained component. Since we estimate OLS models, we can separate the explained component further, to show the detailed contributions from different predictors (e.g., X 1 and X 2 ):
The predictors included in our models are described below.
While our decomposition models are estimated separately for 2000 and 2014, we do not attempt to explicitly decompose the widening gap in premiums over time. Given the large changes that occurred in the employer-sponsored insurance market during our analysis period, it is difficult to select one set of regression coefficients and use it across years. For example, the coefficient on the variable measuring whether a plan had a deductible was large and positive in 2000, but much smaller in 2014. One explanation for this change could be that, in 2000, the coefficient captured the effects of an unmeasured plan characteristic associated with plans with deductibles, but this association was no longer present in 2014.
Because of changes in coefficients over time, the apparent increase in the dollar amount of the contributions to the explained portion of the models likely reflects the effects of changes in coefficients and in plan, employer, and workforce characteristics. To aid readers with interpreting the decomposition results, appendix table A-1
shows selected contributions to the explained portion of the decomposition that were calculated with the use of coefficients from models estimated for both 2000 and 2014. For these selected estimates, the larger dollar contributions in 2014 are due to changing coefficients and widening differences in plan, employer, and workforce characteristics.
Independent variables
In analyzing differences in health insurance premiums, it is important to distinguish between those which are related to the comprehensiveness of benefits and those which are driven by the risk characteristics of employees and employers. Therefore, in our Oaxaca-Blinder models, we include plan, employer, and workforce characteristics. For plan characteristics, we include the following measures: an indicator for whether the plan has an overall deductible, the individual deductible level, hospital and physician coinsurance rates and copayment amounts (including an indicator for whether the hospital copayment is per stay or per day), an indicator for whether the plan has an out-of-pocket maximum, and the maximum out-of-pocket level. We inflate all dollar values to 2014 levels, using the all-items Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers.
Premiums may vary by the use of in-and out-of-network providers and the requirement that enrollees visit a gatekeeper before seeing a specialist. For this reason, we define five different plan types, using plan-level MEPS-IC information on provider arrangements and gatekeeper requirements: (1) plans that allow enrollees to visit any providers with no differential cost incentives (e.g., fee-for-service, or FFS, plans), (2) plans with a mixture of in-and out-of-network providers that have a gatekeeper (e.g., point-of-service, or POS, plans), (3) plans with a mixture of providers that do not have a gatekeeper (e.g., preferred-provider organization, or PPO, plans), (4) plans that require enrollees to use in-network providers (e.g., health maintenance organization, or HMO, plans) and do not have a gatekeeper, and (5) HMO plans that do have a gatekeeper (the omitted category).
Since the services covered by a health plan can affect its cost, our models include two indicators for whether the plan covers dental care and prescription drugs. We also include an indicator for whether the plan is self-insured -a feature employers may adopt in an attempt to reduce premium costs-although the evidence for lower premiums for self-insured plans is inconsistent. 16 One important distinction between public and private workplaces is that a higher percentage of public sector employees are union members with contractually negotiated benefits. In 2014, 29.8 percent of state government employees and 41.9 percent of local government employees were members of a union, compared with 6.6 percent of private sector employees. 17 It is well documented that unionization is associated with higher rates of 7 coverage for health insurance and other nonwage benefits. 18 Some research has also noted the various ways in which unions may constrain public employers' ability to change health insurance benefits. 19 Given that some plan design features are unobserved in our data, including unionization as a control variable may account for unobserved differences in benefits (e.g., size of provider network or limits on the formulary for prescription drugs). At the same time, a more unionized workforce also may have characteristics different from those of a workforce that has no, or fewer, unionized workers. In our models, we include a measure for the proportion of the establishment's workforce that belongs to a union, noting that the coefficient on this variable is difficult to interpret because of possible correlation between our unionization measure and unobserved insurance benefits or unobserved workforce characteristics. To test whether our unionization measure is capturing information on such benefits and characteristics, we perform sensitivity tests by including and excluding this measure and evaluating any resulting changes in plan and workforce contributions toward explaining premium differences.
We also include an establishment-level indicator for whether the employer offers health insurance to retirees.
We include this measure at the establishment, rather than the plan, level, because the MEPS-IC does not contain information on which plans might enroll retirees. If retirees are included in the same risk pool as active employees, this could increase premiums because of the greater risk and higher cost associated with insuring older individuals. 20 Providing evidence that this might occur, 43 states in 2014 offered non-Medicare eligible retirees and their dependents the same plans as those offered to active employees, and 29 of these states enrolled retirees at a premium rate that also applied to active employees. 21 The public sector offers retiree benefits more often than the private sector. This may be due, in part, to a higher concentration of small employers in the private sector, differences in the occupational mix of workers, or both. 22 As noted earlier, it is important to identify differences between public and private premiums that are driven by the characteristics of employees in the two sectors. Studies have shown that workers in the public sector are more likely to be older, to be female, to be married, and to have higher levels of education and longer job tenure than private sector workers. 23 Since the MEPS-IC public sector data on worker characteristics have relatively high rates of item nonresponse compared with the survey's private sector data, we impute worker demographic characteristics for all observations in both sectors. This imputation is performed by creating means from the full sample of the 2000 Decennial Census and the 2014 American Community Survey (ACS) and merging them with the MEPS-IC records.
To create these means, we first limit the samples from each data source to adults who are full-time workers (individuals ages 18 to 64 who worked at least 35 hours per week) and employed in state governments, local governments, and the private sector. We average these data at the state and detailed industry levels for private sector workers and at the state level for state and local government workers. 24 We construct means for the percentages of workers who are female, married, and married females. We also produce averages for all workers and for female workers who are in the following age groups: 18-25 years, 26-35 years, 36-45 years, 46-55 years, and 56-64 years. In addition, we generate means for workers with the following levels of educational attainment: less than high school, high school diploma, some college, associate's degree, bachelor's degree, and graduate degree. Finally, we include state fixed effects to capture variations in the geographic costs of healthcare and other state-level differences. We use plan-level data from the MEPS-IC and weight all estimates by the number of enrollees.
Results
Although premiums for government enrollees were consistently higher than those for private sector enrollees from 2000 to 2014, the gap widened over the period. (See figure 1.) In 2000, average local government premiums were 10 percent higher than private sector premiums ($4,012 versus $3,652) , and average state premiums were 3 percent higher than large-firm private premiums ($3,705 versus $3,602 In table 2, we present the results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition models for public-private premium differences in 2000 and 2014. As discussed earlier, we estimate our decomposition models separately for the 2 years and compare (1) premiums for local government enrollees with those for all private enrollees and (2) premiums for state government enrollees with those for private sector enrollees in large firms. The estimates in Overall, the Oaxaca-Blinder model's explained effects, which reflect the contributions of differences in characteristics between the public and private sectors, are very important for understanding why public premiums were higher than private sector premiums in both years. For example, in our local-private models, differences in characteristics explained $277 of the $360 premium gap in 2000 and $925 of the $1,106 premium gap in 2014. The explanation for these findings is multifaceted. In 2000, a more educated workforce and a higher rate of unionization contributed toward the relatively high premiums for local government enrollees, but plan characteristics, as a group, did not have a significant contribution because of the offsetting positive and negative effects of specific plan characteristics. By 2014, however, differences in plan characteristics were important in explaining premium differences, as were differences in demographic characteristics, rates of unionization, and the possibility that retirees were included in the insurance plans' risk pools. Below, we discuss the detailed results from the decomposition models ( 
Differences in detailed plan characteristics
Differences in plan characteristics were not a significant factor in explaining differences between private sector premiums and either state or local government premiums in 2000. Premium differences in that year were not large, and neither were differences in plan characteristics. (See table 1 .) For example, a similar percentage of public and private enrollees had plans with deductibles in 2000. However, among these enrollees, the mean deductible for private enrollees was significantly larger than the corresponding mean for public enrollees.
By 2014, differences in benefits had widened. Holding other factors constant, combined differences in plan type, out-of-pocket cost-sharing arrangements, and covered services led premiums for local government enrollees to be $174 higher than those for private enrollees ($206 in the model comparing state government enrollees and large-firm private enrollees). 26 In the local-private model, differences in deductibles alone contributed $135 toward this $174 total, reflecting the $524 gap (see table 1) in unconditional deductibles between local government and private sector enrollees. Similarly, the $537 difference in unconditional deductibles between state government and large-firm private enrollees in 2014 contributed $169 toward the premium differences in that year.
In addition, differences in hospital coinsurance rates for state government and private enrollees accounted for $137 of the state-private premium difference in 2014 and $32 of the local-private premium gap. The 2014 decompositions also show that differences in out-of-pocket maximums contributed $32 toward the local-private premium gap and $10 toward the state-private premium gap (p < 0.10 for the latter estimate). In contrast, differences in plan type and dental coverage (which is offered more often in the private than in the public sector) pulled premiums in the opposite direction, contributing toward private premiums being higher than public sector premiums.
Differences in rates of unionization
Unionization is an important factor in explaining public-private differences in premiums. In 2014, differences in unionization rates contributed $336 toward the gap between local and private premiums and $181 of the gap between state and large-firm private premiums. To understand whether these contributions resulted from differences in unobserved worker characteristics or in unobserved benefit generosity negotiated by unions, we reran our models by excluding unionization. Omitting unionization greatly reduced the explained portion of the decomposition models (a reduction of $300 in the 2014 local-private comparison; data not shown), and the factors that were most affected were employer offers of retiree health insurance and workforce characteristics.
In contrast, the contributions of plan characteristics were not affected, which suggests that our unionization measure does not reflect unobserved measures of benefit generosity.
Workforce and employer characteristics
The demographic characteristics of potential enrollees in a health insurance plan help determine the risk and cost-and, therefore, the premiums-associated with insuring these individuals. As shown in table 4, there were significant differences in the demographic characteristics of public and private sector employees in both 2000 and 2014. As other studies have shown, public sector workers are more likely to be female, older, and married than private sector workers. Differences in these three measures accounted for $304 of the 2014 premium difference between local and all private enrollees and $280 of the difference between state and large-firm private enrollees. 27 Public sector workers also had higher levels of educational attainment than private sector workers, and this difference contributed $112 and $162 toward the local-private premium gap in 2000 and 2014,
respectively. While differences in educational attainment contributed $248 toward the gap between state and large-firm private premiums in 2000, they did not contribute to the large premium gap in 2014.
Employer offers of retiree health insurance were far more common in the public than in the private sector in both 2000 and 2014, with 40 to 50 percentage-point differences in the rates at which enrollees worked for employers offering this benefit. In 2014, differences in the offer rates of retiree health insurance accounted for $70 of the local-private premium gap and $98 of the gap between state and large-firm private premiums. 28 As noted earlier, these differences may reflect the possibility that the premiums for some public sector plans were higher than those in the private sector, since public plans are more likely to cover more expensive retired employees.
Finally, in 2014, differences in firm size between local government and private sector employers, along with the different distribution of employers across states, contributed toward private premiums being higher than public premiums. The fact that government enrollees were more likely to be employed at larger employers than private sector enrollees (see table 3 ) lowered government premiums relative to private premiums.
Conclusion
In this article, we used data from the 2000 and 2014 MEPS-IC to compare health insurance premiums for public and private sector enrollees. We used Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition methods to examine the contribution of plan, worker, and employer characteristics toward explaining the public sector's higher premiums. While there was little difference in premiums in the two sectors in 2000, we found that a more educated workforce and a higher rate of unionization in the public sector contributed toward local government enrollees' higher premiums in that year. By 2014, the gaps between public and private sector premiums had grown larger, with public sector premiums exceeding private sector premiums by 14 to 19 percent. We found that differences in plan characteristics played a substantial role in explaining these differences in 2014, but that these characteristics
were not the only, or even the most important, factor. Differences in plan characteristics accounted for $174 of the $1,106 gap between local and private premiums in 2014 and $206 of the $826 gap between state premiums and large-firm private premiums in that year. In comparison, the combined contributions of differences in the age, marital status, and educational attainment of workers and in the share of workers who were female explained $466 of the $1,106 premium gap between local government and all private enrollees in 2014.
Similarly, these combined contributions accounted for $359 of the $826 premium gap between state government and large-firm private enrollees.
Unionization also contributed more toward explaining public-private premium gaps than did plan characteristics in 2014 ($336 of the gap between local and private premiums and $181 of the gap between state and large-firm private premiums). Given the results of our sensitivity analyses, this measure likely reflects variations in worker, rather than plan, characteristics.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to decompose differences in public and private premiums with the aim of identifying specific factors that contribute to higher public sector premiums. While we found that the design features of plans offered by state and local governments contributed to the public sector's higher premiums in 2014, our decomposition analysis revealed that worker and employer characteristics also played a large role-in some comparisons, even larger than that of plan characteristics. We believe that our results on the relative contribution of plan generosity and workforce characteristics can inform the broader debate on the relative compensation of public and private sector workers. Alternatively, if we use the coefficients from the 2000 model to evaluate the effect of differences in plan characteristics in 2014, we find that plan characteristics contributed $51 toward premium differences. The difference between the original estimate of $174
and this alternative estimate of $51 is due to changes in the coefficients between the 2014 and 2000 models.
27 To assess any potential biases from using imputed state-industry measures versus establishment-level measures reported by respondents ("collected" measures), we performed sensitivity tests by running a set of premium regressions for private sector establishments in 2000 and 2014. For these tests, we chose private sector establishments because they had adequate item response rates on variables measuring the percentage of the workforce that is female and the percentage that is age 50 or older.
We found that any potential biases from using imputed versus collected data on workers at different levels of aggregation are difficult to generalize. This is because the "collected" coefficients on the variable measuring the percentage of female workers were smaller than the "imputed" coefficients in the 2014 model, but the "collected" coefficients on the variable measuring the percentage of workers age 50 or older were bigger than the "imputed" coefficients in both the 2000 and 2014 models. The use of imputed versus collected variables did not affect other coefficients in the models.
28 Note that the results were similar when we excluded retiree health insurance from our models.
